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Abstract. This paper augments an R&D-based growth model of the third
generation with human capital accumulation and impure altruism, calibrates
it with U.S. data, and investigates whether the market provides too little or
too much R&D. For benchmark parameters the market share of employment
in R&D is close to the socially optimal allocation. Sensitivity analysis shows
that the order of magnitude of possible deviation between market allocation
and optimal R&D is also smaller than suggested by previous studies. Further-
more, the model allows for two additional channels through which population
growth may affect the resource allocation so that its overall economic impact
is no longer predetermined as being positive. Numerical calibrations show
that economic growth at the U.S. average rate during the last century can
be consistent with a small and probably negative partial correlation between
population growth and economic growth.
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1. Introduction
Research as a market activity naturally implies that resources are suboptimally allocated.
While knowledge spillovers and imperfect appropriation of rents by innovators result in too
little R&D effort from a social perspective, creative destruction and duplication externalities
work in the opposite direction. Negative and positive externalities compensate each other only
by chance so that the question occurs whether the market provides too much or too little
R&D and how large the deviation from the socially optimal solution will be. Estimates can
be given using numerical parameterizations of R&D-driven growth models with actual data.
This way, calibrations of endogenous and semi-endogenous growth models have found rather
large deviations of market solutions from the socially optimal one. The current paper challenges
these findings by investigating an R&D–driven growth model of the third generation augmented
by human capital accumulation.
According to Jones (1999) economic growth theory with endogenous technological change can
be classified into three types or generations of models. Models of the first type are developed
by Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). Long-run
growth is generated by knowledge spillovers of degree one implying a positive correlation between
per capita growth and population size. Criticism of this unobservable scale effect has lead to
the development of second-generation growth models by Jones (1995), Kortum (1997), and
Segerstrom (1998). Two common features of these models are knowledge spillovers of less than
degree one and positive population growth. Spillovers of less than unity eliminate the scale
effect of population size but they also require perpetually increasing research effort for a steadily
positive rate of innovation. Given that a constant fraction of population is engaged in research
this requirement is satisfied by population growth.
Models of the first generation imply that the market usually generates suboptimal growth
through the above mentioned channels. In second-generation models the same growth rate
is realized by market and social planner. Economic growth is semi-endogenous because it is
endogenously explained but driven by parameters which are usually considered as exogenous.
Nevertheless, the market provides suboptimal R&D because externalities and imperfections have
level effects on resource allocation between R&D and other activities.
Stokey (1995) calibrates a first-generation growth model with quality research and Jones
and Williams (2000) investigate a numerically specified semi-endogenous growth model with
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variety research. Both articles find that the optimal share of resources devoted to R&D deviates
in large orders of magnitude from the market solution. For example, letting the duplication
externality vary between zero and one Stokey finds that the share of resources optimally allocated
to R&D lies between 70 percent below and 500 percent above the laissez-faire solution. Jones and
Williams find optimal shares between 30 percent below and 400 percent above market shares.
While models of the first and second generation investigate either variety research or quality re-
search, a third generation of endogenous growth models considers both activities simultaneously.
Common features of earlier third-generation models, developed by Young (1998), Dinopolous
and Thompson (1998), and Peretto (1998), are knowledge spillovers of degree one in improving
quality of products but no spillovers in the variety dimension. A growing population triggers
entry of new firms in variety research as in models of the second generation. If population
stays constant, however, research specializes in improving existing products thereby realizing
increasing returns and generating sustainable growth.
At first sight these models bring back the endogenous growth result and eliminate the need
of population growth for economic growth. Yet, investigating a general two-R&D-sector model
with externalities from both research activities Li (2000) demonstrates that these results hinge
on two knife-edge conditions for knowledge spillovers. The general case of inter-sectoral spillovers
renders growth to be semi-endogenous again and to rely necessarily on population growth.
While the knife-edge argument has found much attention in the subsequent literature another
feature of Li’s model remained relatively unexplored and is the focus of the present paper. The
existence of two interdependent R&D sectors may lead to a reassessment of the deviation of
market research effort from the socially optimal level. In a two-sector R&D model changing
an assumption about an underlying externality may have mainly substitution effects and less
impact on overall research effort. Consider, for example, an increase of knowledge spillovers in
quality research. Taken the external effect into account a social planner would then allocate
more researchers to this activity than the market. However, he may simultaneously allocate
less researchers to variety research, so that the impact on overall R&D effort can less easily be
assessed than suggested by previous studies. The present paper therefore calibrates the general
two-R&D-sector model with U.S. data and re-investigates whether the market provides too much
or too little R&D and how large a deviation from the socially optimal one can be expected.
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The second main topic of the paper is a re-investigation of the role of population growth in
economic growth. For that purpose it augments the R&D-driven growth model with human
capital accumulation and a measure of altruism in preferences. Because it is now effective labor,
i.e. the number of researchers multiplied by their skill level, that is engaged in research, R&D
growth and thereby economic growth do no longer necessarily depend on population growth. For
constant population growing research output can be solely driven by human capital accumulation
and economic growth becomes fully endogenous again. Human capital growth reduces the
importance of R&D because growth of income per capita is no longer driven by TFP growth
only but also by labor quality growth. This reduces the role of R&D-externalities and provides
a further reason for why the deviation of market R&D from the social optimum could be smaller
than suggested by earlier models.1
Furthermore, while the economic impact of population growth through effective labor remains
positive (as in existing R&D models), two channels appear through which a growing population
affects growth negatively. A growing population dilutes the skill level per capita, raises the
opportunity costs of education, and causes slower human capital growth. A second channel
originates from abandoning the assumption of Benthamite utility according to which households
are purely altruistic towards future generations. With less than pure altruism population growth
operates through its dilution of financial wealth per capita similar to depreciation. It leads
to a discount of perceived interest rates and has through this channel a negative impact on
economic growth. Numerical calculations using the model calibrated with U.S. data investigate
the quantitative outcome of the interplay of these three channels and challenge the previously
found result of a large positive correlation between population growth and economic growth.
The next section briefly resumes essential components and analytical results for the general
two-R&D-sector model with human capital accumulation. A detailed derivation and discussion
of the theoretical model is available in Strulik (2005). Section 3 presents the calibration and
benchmark results. Section 4 performs the sensitivity analysis and a final section concludes.
1Employing different arguments two recent articles also find that the actual R&D intensity may be closer to the
social optimum than originally suggested by Stokey (1995) and Jones and Williams (2000). Comin (2004) arrives
at at this conclusion by introducing exogenous technological progress in the Jones-Williams setup. Steger (2005)
generalizes a second-generation model to the extent that capital goods are essential in all sectors of the economy.
This paper emphasizes that a small deviation from optimal R&D is compatible with large welfare losses in the
laissez-faire solution.
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2. The Model
Human capital, which replaces raw labor in an R&D-driven growth model, can be allocated
to employment and education. Human capital employed in production of goods (Hx) is called
workers and employment in quality and variety research (HQ and Hn) is called researchers.
Output of final goods Y sells on a competitive market at a price of one. It is produced by
differentiated intermediate goods using a constant returns to scale technology with elasticity of
substitution σ > 1. After κ innovations in quality research a good j = 1, . . . , n is available at
qualities qkj , kj = 0, 1, . . . , κj and used in quantities xkj . Hence, aggregate output is given by
Y =
∫ n
0
 κj∑
kj=0
qkjxkj
1−1/σ dj

1/(1−1/σ)
. (1)
Each intermediate good j is produced by a monopolistically competitive firm using a linear
production function xkj = Hxj and sold at price pkj = wσ/(σ − 1). At time of invention τ a
good j has initial quality Q1/(σ−1)τ , where Q := (1/n)
∫ n
0 q
σ−1
κi di is an aggregate quality index.
After kj quality innovations it has quality qkj = γ
kjQ
1/(σ−1)
τ . Assuming γ > σ/(σ − 1) implies
that only goods of leading edge quality are supplied.
An improvement from quality level κ to κ+ 1 occurs with probability
µκj =
AQ
qσ−1κj
HQj , AQ := An
α1Qα2H−χQ , (2)
where HQj are researchers employed in quality research for good j. Firms take general produc-
tivity as given which is determined by the following externalities. The term Qα2 is the externality
usually taken into account in third- generation growth models. It describes knowledge spillovers
from quality research assuming that the aggregate quality index Q approximates economy-wide
available knowledge about quality improvements. Here we follow Li (2000) and additionally
allow for knowledge spillovers from variety research to quality research determined by the term
nα1 . The term H−χQ , 0 ≤ χ < 1, captures the possibility of duplication externalities (stepping
on toes effects). Aggregating over j and using the law of large numbers shows that the quality
index grows at rate
Q˙
Q
= (γσ−1 − 1)AQ
Q
HQ
n
. (3)
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New varieties are produced by researchers Hn according to
n˙ = AnHn , An =
Anβ1Qβ2H−χn
Q
, (4)
where β1 and β2 specify the degree of intra- and intersectoral knowledge spillovers in variety
research and χ measures the duplication externality. By placing the quality index in the denom-
inator it is assumed that creation of a new product (with initial quality Q) becomes increasingly
difficult for rising aggregate quality.
Determining market equilibrium and aggregating over goods provides final output as
Y = (nQ)1/(σ−1)Hx . (5)
The term (nQ) shows increasing returns to scale in aggregate production resulting from variety
and quality expansion.
Households maximize intertemporal utility from consumption per capita c ≡ Y/L:∫ ∞
0
[
c1−θ/(1− θ)
]
e−(ρ−mλ)tdt θ > 1 , m ∈ [0, 1] , (6)
where L is population size. Population grows at a given constant rate, λ, which may be positive,
negative, or zero. The time preference rate is denoted by ρ > 0 and 1/θ is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. A particularity of (6) is the parameter m that controls for the degree
of altruism towards future generations. The literature usually considers only one of the border
cases. For m = 0 households maximize utility of consumption per capita (Millian type utility)
and for m = 1 they take equally into account consumption of all members of their dynasty
(Benthamite type utility). Here I employ the idea of Nerlove et al. (1982) and allow for a
continuum of intermediate degrees of altruism.
Households face the usual income budget constraint and a Lucas (1988)-type production
function for education.
h˙ = ξ(h− he)− (δ + λ)h . (7)
The parameter ξ measures productivity in education, h ≡ H/L is human capital per capita,
he is employed human capital (in production and research activities), and δ is the rate of
depreciation of knowledge. Note that population growth operates similar to depreciation of
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knowledge: without further effort in education a growing population dilutes a dynasty’s human
capital per capita.
Solving the households allocation problem provides the Ramsey rule
θgc = r − ρ− (1−m)λ = 1
σ − 1 [gn + gQ] + ξ − δ − ρ− (1−m)λ , (8)
where right hand side equality originates from insertion of equilibrium interest rate and growth
rate of wages. In an equilibrium of supply and demand Y = C = cL, and (5) implies
gc =
1
σ − 1 [gn + gQ]− λ+ gHx . (9)
A balanced growth path is defined by constant sectoral shares of employment and constant
growth of variety and quality. Aggregate growth of human capital is obtained from (7) and
equilibrium on factor markets, He = Hx+Hn+HQ. Differentiating (4) and (3) with respect to
time provides balanced growth rates for R&D.2
gH = ξ
(
1− Hx
H
− HQ
H
− Hn
H
)
− δ , (10a)
gn =
α2 − β2
D
(1− χ)gH , (10b)
gQ =
β1 − α1
D
(1− χ)gH , (10c)
D = (1− α1)(1− β2)− (1− α2)(1− β1) .
From (8) – (10) equilibrium growth is uniquely determined.
gc =
ξ − δ − ρ
θ − 1
(
1− 1
θ + φ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
a>0
+
1
θ − 1
[
m− θ − (1−m)
(θ + φ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
λ, (11)
φ ≡ (θ − 1)(1− χ)
σ − 1
(β1 − α1 + α2 − β2)
D
+ θ .
As in growth models of the third generation, the economic growth rate can be represented as an
affine linear function of population growth, where positivity of a follows from θ > 1 and φ > 0.
With contrast to that literature, however, the partial correlation between both growth rates –
given by the parameter b – is not necessarily positive. For pure Millian preferences (m = 0) the
correlation is negative while it is positive if preferences are purely Benthamite (m = 1).
2For positive growth either spillovers within the same sector have to be larger than across sectors α2 > β2 and
β1 > α1 or the opposite has to be true, α2 < β2 and β1 < α1.
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The intuition for the ambiguity is as follows. Population growth affects economic growth
through three channels, a positive scale effect, a negative human capital dilution effect, and a
positive but possibly small time preference effect. The scale effect operates through the growth
rate (instead of the size) of population and affects R&D just as in models of the second and
third generation. Higher population growth leads to higher growth of aggregate human capital
(gH = gh + λ), and therewith to higher growth of human capital devoted to R&D, higher
growth of research output (visible in (10)), and higher economic growth (through gn and gQ in
(9)). Note, however, that population growth – with contrast to the interpretation delivered in
connection with earlier models – does not lead to a higher number of geniuses (Simon, 1981)
or Isaac Newtons (Jones, 2003) in society. As long as growth of skills per person, gh, remains
constant population growth just increases the number of generally talented researchers.
Population growth, however, affects growth of skills negatively. Because newborns enter the
world uneducated, population growth dilutes the stock of human capital per capita (visible in
(7)). In order to equip a growing population with a certain skill level a larger share of resources
has to be allocated to education than in an otherwise identical economy with a stable population.
When population grows at a higher rate, households face higher opportunity costs of education
and allocate less resources to education, which results in a lower growth rate of human capital
per capita. For households with purely Millian preferences the negative human capital dilution
effect overcompensates the scale effect in R&D so that the overall effect of growth on economic
growth is negative.
For altruistic households a time-preference operates against the human capital dilution effect
because a larger future size of the dynasty increases the weight assigned to consumption per
capita of later generations. More patient households invest more and more investment in R&D
and human capital leads to higher growth. This can best be seen by a raising m in (8). When
m approaches one only the positive scale effect from R&D growth remains. The time preference
effect compensates the dilution effect if preferences are purely Benthamite (gc > 0 for m = 1
in (11)). For intermediate cases of altruism, however, we cannot determine theoretically which
effect dominates and a numerical specification of the model is needed for an assessment of the
correlation between population growth and economic growth.
A social planner also faces growth rates (8) – (10) and would therefore realize the same
economic growth rate as the market. He, however, takes the four types of externalities into
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account and allocates factors differently to sectors. In Strulik (2005) it is shown that net returns
in a market equilibrium with R&D in both sectors requires
ξ − δ =
[
Hx
HQ
1
σ − 1 − 1
]
gQ
γσ−1 − 1 − α1gn − α2gQ + χgH , (12a)
ξ − δ =
[
1
σ − 1
Hx
Hn
− HQ
Hn
]
gn − β1gn − (β2 − 1)gQ + χgH , (12b)
where the net interest rate is given ξ− δ ≡ r− w˙/w. Solving for the social optimum shows that
it implies a factor allocation where (12) is replaced by (13).
ξ − δ =
[
(β2 − 1)Hn
HQ
+
1
σ − 1
Hx
HQ
(1− χ)
]
gQ − (α1 − 1)gn + χgH , (13a)
ξ − δ =
[
(α1 − 1)HQ
Hn
+
1
σ − 1
Hx
Hn
(1− χ)
]
gn − (β2 − 1)gQ + χgH . (13b)
Equations (12) and (13) coincide only accidentally. Usually the planner’s allocation deviates
yielding a higher income level at each point of time and higher welfare than provided by the
market solution. Without numerical specification, however, we cannot decide whether market
R&D effort is too high or too low and how large the difference may be.
3. Calibration
The calibration of the model with U.S. data follows related previous studies of numerical
R&D models, in particular Jones and Williams (2000). The long-run rate of per capita income
is set to 1.75 percent p.a. and the time preference rate to 2.0 percent. Based on the estimate of
Mincer (1974) I set δ = 0.01. According to Jones and Williams growth of the labor force is set
to 1.44 percent and the steady-state interest rate is set to 7.0 percent representing the average
real return on the stock market for the last century.
In the benchmark case we consider a medium degree of altruism, m = 0.5. Inspection of (8)
shows that an economic growth rate of 1.75 percent implies a value of θ of 2.45. Alternatively,
for Millian (m = 0) or Benthamite (m = 1) preferences the implied values of θ are 2.0 and 2.9.
Hence, the whole range of possible elasticities is in an order of magnitude of values usually used
in other calibration studies of economic growth models.
Turning towards market power, let η := σ/(σ − 1) define the markup. Since Jones and
Williams consider markup factors between 1 and 1.37 we set a benchmark value of 1.2 and
provide a sensitivity analysis of results with respect to other values. The benchmark value for
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η implies σ = 6 and a knowledge elasticity of output of .2, exactly as in the Jones-Williams
study. Similarly, since Jones and Williams consider duplication externalities between zero and
one, we set χ = 0.5 in the benchmark case and investigate the impact of parameter variation.
The parameter γ is specified so that the inverse of the rate of creative destruction τ := 1/µ =
(γσ−1 − 1)/gQ is consistent with estimates of the expected lifetime of a design. We consider
lifetimes between 5 and 50 years corresponding to the range of values considered by Stokey and
Jones and Williams and set the benchmark lifetime to 10 years.
Finally, also following Jones and Williams, we require that growth of total factor productivity
(gn+ gQ)/(σ− 1) equals 1.25 percent. From (8) we see that this ties down the value for general
productivity in education (ξ) to 0.0675.
With respect to knowledge spillovers we begin by setting α2 = 1. This assumption of spillovers
of degree one within quality research is made by endogenous growth models of both the first and
the third generation. As a starting point we furthermore assume that production of new ideas
in both R&D sectors is structurally similar and impose symmetry, β1 = α2, β2 = α1. Finally,
we solve equations (8) – (10) which provides the equilibrium growth rates together with a value
for the sole parameter left yet unspecified, the degree of knowledge spillovers between sectors,
α1. For benchmark parameters we obtain gH = 0.019, gn = qQ = 0.31 and α1 = 0.69. The
model calibrated using U.S. data therefore suggests that knowledge spillovers between sectors
are rather large but also clearly smaller than one.
Table 1: Benchmark Parameterization and Results
Parameters and Steady-State Variables Determined
ρ δ λ gc gTFP r
∗ η τ χ α2 m
.02 .01 .0144 .0175 .0125 .07 1.2 10 .5 1.0 .5
Parameters and Steady-State Values Implied
α1 ξ σ gn gQ gH θ b
.69 .0675 6.0 .031 .031 .019 2.45 -.053
Market Solution Social Optimum
Hx Hn HQ R&D-Share (sDC) Hx Hn HQ R&D-Share (sSP )
49.3 2.24 4.94 7.18 50.0 3.27 3.27 6.54
Factor allocation in percent of human capital endowment (potential work force), e.g. Hx = 50 means
50 percent of human capital is allocated in manufacturing.
Given theses values, we calculate the factor allocation for the decentralized economy (DC)
from (10a) and (12) and the optimal allocation chosen by the social planner (SP ) from (10a) and
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(13). Aggregating both allocations we obtain the total share of employment in R&D sDC = 7.2
percent and sSP = 6.5 percent indicating that the market provides somewhat too much R&D.
Besides allocating slightly less resources to R&D the planner chooses a different allocation of
researchers to quality and variety research. Internalizing spillovers he allocates equal shares of
3.3 percent of total employment to both research activities while the market allocates 4.9 percent
to quality research and only 2.2 percent to variety research. The main cause of deviation is the
probability of success (i.e. the rate of creative destruction) which is internalized by the planner
but not by the market solution. Because creative destruction reduces the time span during
which a newly invented variety creates value for the initial inventor, the market allocates too
few researchers to variety research and too much to quality research. Compared with earlier
studies the overall deviation between market solution and social optimum one can be assessed
as small. For duplication externalities of .5 Jones and Williams (Table 2) obtain an R&D ratio
(sSP /sDC) of 1.67. The present calibration calculates this share as 0.91.
Given the fully numerically specified model we can read off the implied correlation between
economic and population growth from equation (11). The value for b is −0.0527 indicating a
slightly negative correlation close to zero. Doubling population growth from 1.4 to 2.8 percent
would lower economic growth from 1.75 to 1.70 percent. This result of an almost insignificant
impact of population growth contrasts sharply with earlier findings. In Stokey’s endogenous
growth model of the first generation population growth would cause hyper- exponential economic
growth. In Jones andWilliams’ semi-endogenous growth model the coefficient of correlation must
be by design larger than unity.3 Table 1 summarizes benchmark parameterization and results.
4. Results of Sensitivity Analysis
Given the large uncertainty about the true magnitude of the various external effects, point
estimates of factor allocations are relatively useless. This is in particular true given the large
sensitivity of results against parameter variation obtained by Stokey and Jones and Williams.
We therefore follow these authors and investigate results in form of sensitivity analysis.
The left hand side of Figure 1 shows results with respect to alternative duplication externali-
ties. The solid line assumes the benchmark interest rate. Because the “stepping on toes effect”
is taken into account by the social planner, a higher duplication externality implies a lower
3It can be obtained as 1.3 from their “typical calibration”, Table 2, p. 75.
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Figure 1. R&D-Share: Social Planner/Market Solution (s)
Against Duplication Externality (χ) and Lifetime of Design (τ)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.5
1
1.5
2
10 20 30 40 50
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8 s  s
χ τ
Solid Lines r∗ = 0.07, Dashed Lines r∗ = 0.1, and Dotted Lines r∗ = 0.04. Other Parameters
as in Table 1.
optimal share of R&D. For values of χ above 0.45, the market allocates too much resources to
R&D. In the corresponding scenario in Jones and Williams overinvestment occurs only at much
higher externalities above 0.75.4 Dotted and dashed lines show sensitivity with respect to the
interest rate which is also the net return of R&D in the market solution. For low interest rates
(returns on research) of 4 percent the market allocates too little resources to R&D except for
high duplication elasticities above 0.8. Given high interest rates of 10 percent the market invests
too much in R&D for duplication elasticities above 0.2.
Compared with results from Stokey (Figure 3) and Jones and Williams (Figure 1) the overall
impression from the current analysis is that of less sensitivity of results against parameter
variation. This finding has a straightforward intuition. With human capital accumulation the
present model takes a further engine of growth into account. The new channel of factor quality
growth mitigates the importance of R&D – the activity where the externalities are present – for
economic growth. Hence, holding economic growth constant at benchmark values, varying the
size of the externality has a smaller impact on factor allocation.
A longer lifetime of a design decreases the probability of success in quality improvements. It
discourages quality research and encourages variety research. The right hand side of Figure 1
shows that the negative quality effect dominates with respect to total R&D effort. By showing
only small deviations of total R&D with respect lifetime, however, the figure does not reveal
the underlying intersectoral movements in opposite directions, which are comparatively large.
For example, if the lifetime of a design is 20 years instead of 10, market employment in variety
4Note that χ corresponds to 1− ξ in Stokey and to 1− λ in Jones and Williams.
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research raises from 2.2 to 3.0 percent and employment in quality research decreases from 4.9 to
3.3 percent while optimal employment remains at 3.1 percent in both sectors. As a consequence
of these counterbalancing intersectoral shifts the overall R&D ratio sSP /sDC changes only from
0.91 to 1.03 rendering a market employment in R&D very close to the socially optimal level.
Generally we observe that changing the lifetime of a design has a smaller impact on total R&D
effort as suggested by numerical studies of one-sector R&D models. Instead of discouraging (or
encouraging) total R&D effort it mainly leads to a substitution from quality research to variety
research with little impact on total resources devoted to R&D.
At first sight one might be tempted to think that the general two-sector R&D model will
show a large sensitivity of results with respect knowledge spillovers because it establishes so
many ways of inter- and intrasectoral knowledge flows. This is, however, not generally the
case. The growth rates gc and gTFP (i.e. the sum of gn and gQ) are predetermined by the data
and tie down the endogenously obtained value for α1. Thus, any variation in one of the other
knowledge spillovers will mainly cause an adjustment of α1 with little impact on growth rates
and economy-wide employment in R&D.
Figure 2. Knowledge Spillovers and R&D Shares
0.9 1 1.1 1.2
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
α1
α2
 s
0.9 1 1.1 1.2
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
α2
Solid lines: maintaining the assumption of symmetric R&D sectors: β1 = α2, β2 = α1.
Dashed lines: maintaining the benchmark parameterization β1 = 1, β2 = 0.7.
Figure 2 shows adjustment of α1 and the implied change of the R&D ratio for varying α2.
Results when the symmetry assumption between sectors continues to hold (i.e. α1 = β2, α2 = β1)
are represented by solid lines. In that case inter- and intra-sectoral spillovers are almost linearly
substituted against each other with virtually no impact on the overal sSP /sDC ratio. Dashed
lines show results when the symmetry assumption is abandoned and β1 and β2 are fixed to
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benchmark values. This scenario causes some variation in R&D shares; for parameter values
within a reasonable range, however, the effect is still relatively small.5
Figure 3. R&D-Share: Social Planner/Market Solution (s)
Markup Factor and Population Growth
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
1
2
3
0 0.01 0.02 0.03
0.5
1
1.5
2
 s
 s
η λ
Solid lines r∗ = 0.07, dashed lines r∗ = 0.1, and dotted lines r∗ = 0.04. Other Parameters
as in Table 1.
The lower the markup factor the lower the incentive to invest in R&D and hence the lower the
market employment in research and the lower the sSP /sDC ratio. This is shown in Figure 3. Yet,
changing markups within an empirically plausible range causes comparatively little variation of
R&D shares around the socially optimal solution. For example, at the lowest value of 1.1 the
R&D ratio is 1.60, less than half the size of the corresponding value in Jones and Williams (read
off as 3.5 from the lower right panel in Figure 1, p. 77). Again, the explanation for the smaller
sensitivity of results is that R&D is no longer the only engine of growth, and hence variation in
market power, which affects R&D but not human capital accumulation, has a smaller impact
on the R&D employment needed to generate the U.S. growth rate.
The righthand side of Figure 3 indicates that population growth has only little impact on the
market’s deviation from socially optimal R&D effort. This result is of course to a great extent
explained by the fact population growth is not an externality. It does neither appear in (10a)
nor in (12) and (13). This means that it affects factor allocation only very indirectly through
the estimated value for the externality α1 (in the calibration of growth rates (8) to (10)).
From a small effect of population growth on the market’s misallocation of resources one cannot
necessarily conclude an overall small economic impact. It might mainly affect growth rates of
5Note that growth rates become negative as α1 approaches 0.7, the fixed benchmark value of β2. Given that
growth rates are predetermined at certain positive values by the data, the set of equations (8) to (10) is solvable
only for α2’s sufficiently larger than 0.7.
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human capital and research output which are identical for social planner and market. While an
intermediate degree of altruism imposed in benchmark calibration (m = 1/2) has indeed revealed
a small correlation between population growth and economic growth the question occurs whether
this result is robust against alternative assumptions about altruism. It is answered in the final
numerical experiment.
Figure 4. The Impact of Altruism:
Correlation between Population Growth and Economic Growth: b = ∂gc/∂λ
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
 m
 b
Solid lines lines: recalibration of θ, dashed lines: benchmark θ = 2.4.
Figure 4 shows the estimated correlation, b, for altruism ranging from pure egoism (m = 0)
to pure altruism (m = 1). If the U.S. were populated by households with Millian preferences
population growth would have a measurable negative effect on economic growth with a corre-
lation coefficient of about −0.37. For increasing altruism the correlation coefficient decreases
in absolute terms and becomes positive when m surpasses 0.6. If households have Benthamite
preferences (which are frequently assumed in endogenous growth literature) the correlation is
about +0.16. Empirical studies, however, suggest that the degree of altruism towards future
generations is clearly less than one and possibly small (See Altonji et al., 1997, Laitner and
Ohlsson, 2001). For intermediate values of altruism the model provides the result that scale
effect, dilution effect, and preference effect almost compensate each other so that the correlation
of population growth and economic growth is close to zero. This result contrasts sharply with
the earlier endogenous growth literature where population growth is the sole driving force of
technological progress (and a correlation coefficient larger than one is obtained). Yet, it accords
with the empirical evidence (see e.g. Brander and Dowrick, 1994).
An assessment of the importance of R&D, labor force growth, and human capital accumulation
for economic growth can also be given by a growth accounting exercise. Using equation (9),
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GDP growth, gY = gc + λ, consists of TFP growth (gn + gQ)/(σ − 1), and a second term
gH , which can be further subdivided into factor quantity growth λ and factor quality growth
gh = gH − λ. Now consider the calibrated U.S. economy.6 Without education, TFP growth
would explain 1−λ/(gc+λ) = 55% of economic growth. With education, TFP growth explains
1 − gH/(gc + λ) = 0.39%, a much lower share which is also closer to empirical estimates.
Factor quantity growth contributes λ/(gc+λ) = 45% to GDP growth and factor quality growth
contributes 15%. The quality contribution corresponds roughly with the empirical estimates
and is completely missing in R&D growth models without educational sector.7
5. Conclusion
This paper has investigated a two-R&D-sector growth model augmented by human capital
accumulation and impure altruism. Results from a calibration with U.S. data have argued that
the market share of employment in R&D is closer to the socially optimal level than suggested by
earlier numerical studies. The deviation from optimal R&D is also less sensitive to parameter
variation than previously obtained. The finding is explained by substitution possibilities between
R&D activities and the additional role of human capital growth.
For a correct assessment of the result note, however, that the analysis has also shown that little
deviation of the economy-wide R&D effort from the social optimum is compatible with relatively
large sectoral deviations. Hence, the conclusion that laissez-faire provides approximately the
optimal resource allocation, does not necessarily follow. Because of specific sectoral externalities
a social planner might allocate researchers quite differently to sectors than the market although
he chooses almost the same overall employment in research.
The investigation has also found that an explanation of last century’s average U.S. growth by
R&D-activities and human capital accumulation is compatible with the empirical finding of a
small and probably negative correlation between population growth and economic growth.
6Note the different focus of growth accounting. Here, we investigate GDP growth while the last section has
focussed on growth of income per capita.
7Pencavel (1993) estimates that 23.4 percent of American economic growth during 1973 to 1984 was attributable
to increased education. Dougherty and Jorgenson (1996) estimate that education has contributed 18.5 percent to
U.S. growth between 1960 and 1989.
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